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THE CONDITIONS OF LEGITIMACY: A
RESPONSE TO JAMES WEINSTEIN
Jeremy Waldron*
I
Thanks and congratulations are due to Professor Weinstein
for his careful elaboration of the legitimacy-based argument
against the regulation of hate speech.1 This is not the first
formulation of the argument. Ronald Dworkin set out a briefer
version of it in a “Foreword” he contributed to a volume entitled
Extreme Speech and Democracy, edited by Weinstein and Ivan
Hare.2 But his comments were not very extensive and perhaps
they have been underestimated. Weinstein says that this line of
argument is “often omitted from the litany of values [relevant to
the hate speech debate] recognized by courts and
commentators.”3 Weinstein himself thinks it is “the most powerful
argument against hate speech bans.”4
There have been gestures towards a political legitimacy
argument in the work of other free speech scholars, who
considered the significance of the connection between democracy
and the foundations of the First Amendment. The first name that
springs to mind is that of Alexander Meikeljohn; and some of
Robert Post’s writings have continued this theme.5 Unfortunately
that work was not much more than gestural: it did not propound
the legitimacy argument in a way that opened it to serious analytic
evaluation. But now at last—here—we have a version of the
*
1.

University Professor, School of Law, New York University.
James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017).
2. RONALD DWORKIN, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, at v-ix
(Ivan Hare and James Weinstein eds., 2009).
3. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 528
4. Id. at 531
5. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000).
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argument that is presented in a sustained and rigorous way, and
the debate about free speech and hate speech is the better for it.
I like to think I have contributed something to this increase
in rigor by subjecting Dworkin’s version of the legitimacy
argument to sustained exposition and critique over thirty pages in
The Harm in Hate Speech, a book based on my 2009 Holmes
Lectures at Harvard Law School.6 I will continue that enterprise
in this paper, harping away at some of Weinstein’s formulations
and questioning a few of the important points that he makes. This
is not intended as disrespect, but as tribute to the seriousness of
the argument he is making. For I think Weinstein agrees that it is
important to ascertain whether the legitimacy argument against
the regulation of hate speech is impressionistic only or whether it
succeeds in identifying concerns that really ought to engage our
attention.
The topic is important but challenging. “Legitimacy” has a
rather loose meaning in political philosophy. Its meaning can veer
between the normative and the empirical, and between the basis
of a state’s right to govern and the sentiment among its subjects
that they have an obligation to obey. This indeterminacy is partly
a function of its neglect in political theory, and we should welcome
its being brought up in this context: better some discussion of it in
the context of hate speech regulation than no discussion at all.
When I began thinking about hate speech regulations, I was
particularly struck by Ronald Dworkin’s invocation of legitimacy
for previously he had been rather dismissive of the topic. In his
1996 book Freedom’s Law, Dworkin defended judicial review by
saying that if a political decision improved democracy, it didn’t
much matter whether that decision came about through judicial
procedures or through full participation. A judicial decision which
established a basis for mutual respect, for example, would actually
improve democracy by securing one of the conditions without
which the moral claims of majority-rule would be non-existent. So
there could be no democratic objection to it.7
Dworkin seemed to be suggesting that when the conditions
of democracy were at stake, procedural legitimacy did not matter.

6.
7.

JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 173–203 (2012).
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15–35 (1996). For a critique of Dworkin’s argument, see
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 282–302 (1999).
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And if this were accepted, presumably the same might be said
about public debate as well. The fact that a matter was decided
without a full public debate would not matter to legitimacy if the
decision-procedure that was used improved the conditions of
democracy. But now, in the argument about hate speech,
legitimacy is being taken much more seriously as a procedural
value. It matters not just what laws we have but how they were
enacted—by whose votes and under what conditions of
deliberation. Dworkin and Weinstein are insisting that the
enforcement of good laws, however just they are in their content,
may be illegitimate if the conditions under which they were
enacted did not include unrestricted debate as well as the fair
processes of representative democracy.
This twist in Dworkin’s approach to legitimacy is particularly
interesting because a case might be made that hate speech laws
are actually aimed at securing the conditions of democracy in
precisely the fashion that Dworkin indicated in Freedom’s Law.
He said there that majority-voting is hardly a legitimate mode of
political decision among people who have contempt for one
another or where there is hatred between various factions. Any
partisan of democracy needs to be concerned therefore about
actions that are calculated to stir up such hatred and contempt.
Since that is precisely the concern of hate speech laws, a case can
be made—if we accept Dworkin’s view in Freedom’s Law—that
hate speech restrictions contribute positively to democratic
legitimacy by helping sustain some of the conditions of democracy
as well as detracting from democratic legitimacy—if Dworkin and
Weinstein are right—by interfering with free speech.
In discussing a similar view held by Alexander Brown,8
Weinstein says that it is difficult to weigh these opposite
legitimacy effects against one another. He thinks one is systemic
and the other isn’t—“The work done by these two types of
legitimacy is very different”—and this makes balancing difficult.9
But that does not mean that Brown’s concern can be dismissed or
ignored. Back of all the points I am going to make in this essay
8. ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
(2015).
9. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 697. “Legitimacy” does systemic work when it is
concerned with the overall moral status of a state or legal system; it does non-systemic
work when it is used to evaluate the status of some particular law or policy or governmental
action.
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responding to Weinstein is a worry that the argument about
political legitimacy is just being wheeled into the hate speech
debate opportunistically by people who have never otherwise
shown that they take it seriously. I want to make sure that the
argument is not just being rigged up for the purposes of the hate
speech debate. One way of showing that it is not rigged would be
to commit to following the legitimacy principle where it leads—in
favor of some hate speech regulation as well as against it.
II
In this spirit, before addressing the substance of the case that
Weinstein makes, I want to identify a few areas where his
arguments are potentially misleading or where they exaggerate
the concerns that he points to. The gist of his case is that hate
speech restrictions placed upon speakers in a polity can
sometimes—and do often—have the effect of diminishing the
legitimacy of the measures that the speakers are discussing. That
case is important and it needs to be addressed head on. But it is
best to do so without distractions
A first point is that the case Weinstein is making obviously
depends on the nature of the restrictions. A restriction on what
may be said is one thing; the total exclusion of an individual from
public discourse is another. Proponents of the legitimacy
argument are sometimes as loose as they think they can get away
with on this matter.10 So, for example, there are passages where
Weinstein appears to imply that hate speech restrictions lead to
total exclusion. He talks about the “silencing” effect of hate
speech laws.11 And he quotes himself as having said in an earlier
article that legitimacy becomes problematic “[i]f an individual is
excluded from participating in public discourse because the
government disagrees with the speaker’s views or because it finds
the ideas expressed too disturbing or offensive.”12

10. So for example, Dworkin complains that the effect of hate speech laws is that
certain people are “forbidden to raise a voice in protest or argument or objection” against
some proposals for law. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 579. And Weinstein notes Robert
Post’s claim “that hate speech restrictions undermine legitimacy by excluding those with
bigoted views from participating in the formation of public opinion.” Id. at 578 (emphasis
added).
11. Id. at 579.
12. Id. at 529 (quoting James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech,
97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 (2011)).
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It is as though such laws were to identify racists (for example)
by name and forbid them from voting and from speaking. Maybe
such legislation is imaginable: some regimes in recent memory
have imposed comprehensive disenfranchisement upon
individuals on account of their “hateful” views about socialism or
whatever. But I know of nothing called “hate speech legislation”
in modern democracies which has or is intended to have this
effect. And I don’t think we should take this possibility as our
exemplar.
A more helpful formulation is that such legislation means
that certain speakers are “forbidden from expressing a particular
view.”13 But even this is hyperbole. Most hate speech laws forbid
only speech acts that are intended to have a certain effect—
namely the stirring up of hatred in a community against a section
of or a group within that community. The self-same proposition
uttered patently without such intention or in a manner or in
circumstances in which it would not be reasonable for the speaker
to have foreseen such an effect is not prohibited. (To this extent,
I would like to qualify my concession in The Harm in Hate Speech
that hate speech restrictions are undoubtedly content-based: they
are sort of content-based, but mostly they get at content only by
virtue of its intended effect on the community, rather than on the
sole basis of the propositions expressed.)14
Moreover, most hate speech restrictions add to this a
requirement that the speech which is intended to have the effect
just mentioned must also be expressed in a certain manner before
it is liable to prosecution. So, for example, section 18(1) of the
UK’s Public Order Act dealing with racial hate speech stipulates
that prosecution is possible only against
A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behaviour, or displays any written material which is
threatening, abusive or insulting … if— (a) he intends thereby
to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the
circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.15

In other words, the language used has to have a threatening,
abusive, and insulting character as well as the specific intent just
mentioned. Absent such character or absent such intent, the
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Compare WALDRON, supra note 6, at 150–55.
Public Order Act 1986, UK ST 1986, c. 64, pt. III, § 18.
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expression of a given view is not prohibited. So it is misleading to
say that hate speech restrictions prohibit the expression of certain
views per se.
Notice by the way that section 18(1) makes “threatening,
abusive or insulting words or behaviour” necessary, not sufficient
for the offense. There still must be the intent to stir up racial
hatred. It is true that British law also has other provisions—public
order provisions, not hate speech provisions—which prohibit the
use of threatening or abusive words or behavior, or disorderly
behavior “within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be
caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby”: that is the effect of
section 5 of the Public Order Act.16 But that is not a hate speech
provision and its operation is quite separate—and controversies
about it are quite separate—from prohibitions on hate speech.
Not everything that restricts speech or protects people from abuse
counts as a hate speech restriction, even if it is found in the same
omnibus statute. Section 5 is more like a fighting words provision
or a public order provision, and the issues raised by regulations
with this orientation are quite different from those raised by the
hate speech provision. The latter has a specific evil in mind: the
proliferation of racial hatred in a community. The former is aimed
at a different evil—namely public disorder. If Professor Weinstein
wants to make a case that section 5 of the UK’s Public Order Act
is over-inclusive either on its face or as applied in recent cases, I
will gladly join him. It has nothing to do with our disagreement
about hate speech.
I labor this point because Weinstein cites the invocation of
section 5 of the Public Order Act in a number of British cases—
the cases of Mark Norwood, Harry Hammond, Shawn Holes, and
Michael Overd—to illustrate his contention that hate speech laws
make it quite difficult to safely express the basic “propositional
content” of bigoted views even when expressed without
vituperation or use of vicious epithets.17 He believes these cases
show that most hate speech laws, whatever their intent, manifestly
do not in practice provide a “safe haven” for expressing
“something like the propositional content” of bigoted views that
become illegal only “when expressed as vituperation.”18

16.
17.
18.

Public Order Act 1986, UK ST 1986, c. 64, pt. I, § 5(1).
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 554–57.
Id. at 560.
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Weinstein regards the cases cited in this paragraph as crucial for
his argument. He says that his discussion of these British examples
involves “examination of the actual operation of hate speech laws
in force.”19 Yet none of them involves the use of British hate
speech provisions such as section 18(1). They are all about the
enforcement of public order provisions which are formulated
without reference to the stirring up of racial hatred.
True, in one of the cases that Weinstein cites, the case of
Mark Norwood, the violation of section 5 led to an aggravated
penalty because the violation was found to be “motivated (wholly
or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious
group” under sections 28 and 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act
1998.20 I hope Professor Weinstein will not regard it as pedantic
of me to point out that this is a hate crime provision not a hate
speech provision. As I said in my book,
though the two ideas—hate speech and hate crimes—do have
a distant connection, they really raise quite different issues in
our thinking about law. The idea of hate crimes is an idea that
definitely does focus on motivation: it treats the harboring of
certain motivations in regard to unlawful acts like assault or
murder as a distinct element of crime or as an aggravating
factor. But in most hate speech legislation, hatred is relevant
not as the motivation of certain actions, but as a possible effect
of certain forms of speech.21

Hate crime provisions can involve the aggravation of offenses
of all sorts, beatings as well as speakings. There are hate crimes
provisions all over American statute books—in forty-five states
and in the federal Civil Rights Act. They are controversial,
certainly (and I am not sure what Professor Weinstein’s view of
them is); but it is a different controversy than the one about hate
speech.
No doubt there are hate speech laws in the world expressed
less carefully, with less attention to these fastidious distinctions
than the British provisions I have cited. But our debate is about
hate speech restrictions as such, not about the least wellformulated of them. Just as I will try to make the legitimacy
19. Id. at 554.
20. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 554–55 (quoting Norwood v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin
/2003/1564.html).
21. WALDRON, supra note 6, at 35.
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argument the best it can be (before refuting it), so opponents of
hate speech regulation ought to consider the best case that can be
made for regulation of this sort and the best drafting that has
emerged from fifty years or more of legislative experience in most
advanced democracies before attempting to show that
nevertheless such regulations are wrong in principle.
III
With these points taken care of, let us turn now to the issue
of principle. Does the enactment and enforcement of hate speech
prohibitions undermine political legitimacy in our society? How
is this undermining supposed to work?
Like Weinstein,22 I shall use the helpful terminology of
upstream and downstream laws.23 Downstream laws are laws that
are enacted by the political process; upstream laws are laws that
affect the political process. (Of course upstream laws must also
have been enacted; they are in that sense downstream also. But I
will use “downstream” to refer to laws that are the product of the
political process without being intended also to affect the political
process.) A downstream law (Ld) may be a law against
discrimination (say, discrimination against same-sex couples in
public accommodations). An upstream law (Lu) may a law
prohibiting speech which is calculated to stir up hatred against
members of the LGBT community. Weinstein’s position is that
the enforcement of Lu may make a difference to the legitimacy of
Ld. A free and open political debate in the community is so
important to political legitimacy that any law such as Lu that seeks
to limit or moderate the contributions that a given citizen, P, may
make to the debate about Ld compromises the legitimacy of Ld as
enacted in these circumstances.
Now Weinstein has acknowledged that the impact on
legitimacy may not be drastic; that is, it may not make Ld literally
unenforceable. He seems to accept the retraction by Ronald
Dworkin of a very aggressive initial version of the legitimacy
argument, namely, that the enforcement of hate speech laws
destroys the legitimacy of laws like Ld.24 Under pressure Dworkin
22. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 530.
23. The terminology was introduced by Dworkin, in DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii,
and followed in WALDRON, supra note 6, at 78-79.
24. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii says that we cannot suppress hate speech “without
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had to concede that political legitimacy was a matter of degree,
and he retreated to the view that the relevant effect on legitimacy
was diminution rather than destruction.25 Weinstein I think agrees
with that. Still, he believes the effect can be considerable,
particularly when there are already other difficulties with Ld and
its enforcement.
In one other regard, Weinstein’s position is more modest
than Dworkin’s. Dworkin wanted to say that the enactment and
enforcement of a hate speech law may have a general and
pervasive impact on downstream political legitimacy. He didn’t
think it could be limited to an effect on just one law. This is
because, as he understood it, a lot of what is forbidden as hate
speech is not tailored as an intervention in any particular
legislative debate:
A community’s legislation and policy are determined more by
its moral and cultural environment, the mix of its people’s
opinions, prejudices, tastes, and attitudes than by editorial
columns or party political broadcasts or stump political
speeches. It is as unfair to impose a collective decision on
someone who has not been allowed to contribute to that moral
environment, by expressing his political or social convictions or
tastes or prejudices informally, as on someone whose
pamphlets against the decision were destroyed by the police.26

It follows that the enforcement of hate speech laws against P
may make a difference to the legitimacy of Ld even if P’s
intervention was not directed at the debate about Ld in particular.
The flip side of this is that the enforcement of a hate speech law
(Lu) may actually make a difference to the legitimacy of all our
enacted laws, because they are all supposed to be enacted (or
protected from amendment or repeal) in an atmosphere of free
and general debate about social purposes and ideals. It has a
wholesale effect, according to Dworkin, partly because of these
points about the diffuse nature of public debate and partly
because legitimacy might be a systemic attribute—an attribute of
forfeiting our moral title to force such people to bow to the collective judgments that do
make their way into the statute books.” See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 529 (quoting
DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii).
25. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 530, cites Dworkin as acknowledging in an e-mail to
Waldron that “[o]n balance Britain is entitled to enforce such laws, I think, but we are left
with a deficit in legitimacy—something to regret under that title—because of the
censorship.”
26. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii.
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a whole political system—rather than an attribute of particular
laws.27 I think Weinstein does not accept this. Certainly for the
purposes of our argument here, Weinstein is interested in a more
focused impact: the retail effect on the legitimacy of Ld as a result
of the enforcement of Lu in the debate about Ld. He seems to
suggest that the only laws whose legitimacy is affected by hate
speech regulation are those directly related to the content of the
hate speech under restriction. For example, he says: “laws
forbidding people from expressing the view . . . that
homosexuality is immoral or disordered, can destroy the moral
justification for enforcing laws against sexual-orientation
discrimination.”28
Weinstein’s position is more focused in another way too. He
is interested in the legitimacy effect of the hate speech law on
particular people—namely, the people whose interventions in a
legislative debate are affected (for example, deterred) by the hate
speech law. It is the legitimacy of the downstream law so far as
these people are concerned that Weinstein wants to focus on. I
don’t think he takes a position on whether there is any impact on
the legitimacy of enforcing Ld against people other than P—for
example, people to whom it would never occur to make an
intervention of the kind prohibited by Lu or indeed people who
have cheerfully made other less vicious contributions, even if still
adversarial, in the debate about Ld.
I worry that this aspect of Weinstein’s position may get
tangled up in Rule-of-Law issues about generality. Hate speech
laws are presented as quite general: they forbid anyone from
stirring up hatred against racial and religious groups and people
identified by sexual orientation. Even if they only have to be
enforced against a few extremists, they have a potential impact on
everyone’s speech. To the extent that this is so, it may be hard to
identify the basis for in personam illegitimacy of the type that
Weinstein’s position suggests.
Anyway, all of this presupposes that we are in possession of
a theory of political legitimacy (not specifically invented for this
debate) that enables us to make these subtle differentiations. I
27. As I have already mentioned, Weinstein does not want to acknowledge the
systemic impact of hate speech laws on political legitimacy. If he did, he would not be able
to rely on an alleged incommensurability between systemic and non-systemic effects
systematicity in his response to Alexander Brown. See supra text accompanying note 8.
28. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 527.
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mean a theory of political legitimacy that is not just rigged to yield
this result. I do believe that Dworkin’s wholesale position is
untenable: I mean his view that the enforcement of a hate speech
law diminishes the legitimacy of all subsequently enacted
downstream laws so far as all citizens are concerned. Some
readers will think that the best explanation of why Weinstein has
focused the legitimacy argument as he does is simply to make it
come out as less implausible than Dworkin’s wholesale version.
The only way of refuting that suspicion would be to show us an
independently-justified argument about political legitimacy that
would enable us to make these differentiations. Weinstein makes
a brave attempt at this task, but (as I shall now show) I think he
fails.
IV
What makes our laws legitimate? I have heard moral
philosophers say that the best argument for the legitimacy of our
laws (or of any particular law (L)) is a showing that the laws are
morally justified or that L in particular is morally justified.
Weinstein—I think—accepts this so far as certain rudimentary
laws of social order are concerned, such as laws against murder
and rape.29 This is one way in which he begins to narrow things
down to his focused position: the enforcement of Lu does not
impact the legitimacy of these rudimentary laws since their
legitimacy is purely a matter of content not process.
However, for most of our laws, there is good-faith
disagreement in the political community about whether they are
justified on their merits. And the problem of legitimacy is to find
a basis on which a law may permissibly be enforced even against
people who disagree with its content. What we usually say is that
the enforceability of L is legitimate because of the way in which L
was adopted even in the face of this disagreement. In modern
democracies, laws are adopted by debate and voting in
constitutionally structured legislatures. The legislatures are
populated in their turn by elected representatives. The elected
representatives consider bills that are put before them, and they
debate their merits. The upshot of those debates is a vote in the
various houses of the legislature. These debates and decisions in

29.

Weinstein, supra note 1, at 538.

10 - WALDRON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

708

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/1/17 9:58 AM

[Vol. 32:697

a representative legislature are usually seen as legitimizing the
enforcement as law of the bills that survive this process.
Now so far, there is no foothold for an argument about
legitimacy based on the impact of hate speech prohibitions.
Speech in parliament is usually privileged. I am not aware of any
case where a legislator has been prosecuted or threatened with
prosecution in respect to the hateful intention of his remarks in a
legislative debate. Certainly such an application is far from
typical. So how exactly is it that the prohibition of hate speech
undermines the legitimacy of the enforcement of a downstream
law? I think we have to look at aspects of political procedure that
go beyond parliamentary debate. We might consider the
possibility of laws enacted by initiative; but I shall put that to one
side. The best case for the Weinstein argument looks at the
informal public debate that is involved in the election and
electoral accountability of legislators and in the debates in the
community that complement legislative debates in the parliament.
Legislation is enacted by representatives, but representatives
are supposed to be elected in a process that directly involves the
people, where the people talk with one another—less formally
now than in representative debate in the legislature—and then
vote. So perhaps we should consider the impact of upstream laws
like hate speech laws on that part of the process. Also legislation
is a public matter. When bills are being considered in the
legislature and public policy debated more generally in our
political institutions, we expect that the formal debate among the
elected legislators will be echoed by less formal and more diffuse
debate on the issues in civil society. We expect that the two
different arenas of debate will influence each other, so that
anything that is said in the streets, on the blogs, or in the
newspapers might potentially affect things that are said and votes
that are cast in the legislature (and vice versa). Of course there is
no guarantee. My letter to the newspaper may not be published;
there may be no hits on my blog; eyes may be turned away from
my graffiti; my spoken words may disappear into the wind;
perhaps no one will turn up for the meetings I organize; and the
leaflets I distribute may end up in the gutter (from whence they
came). Still it is part of our conception of the legitimate political
process that it faces like this in both ways.
It is this broader debate that must be the focus of the
argument that Weinstein and Dworkin want to make about hate
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speech. Weinstein quotes Hans Kelsen as having explained this to
us in the middle of the last century:
The will of the community, in a democracy, is always created
through a running discussion between majority and minority,
through free consideration of arguments for and against a
certain regulation of a subject matter. This discussion takes
place not only in parliament, but also, and foremost, at political
meetings, in newspapers, books, and other vehicles of public
opinion. A democracy without public opinion is a contradiction
in terms.30

Weinstein adds: “It is through public opinion that the people,
the ultimate governors in a democratic society, control their
representatives between elections.”31
But here is where things become difficult. It is one thing to
say that public deliberation—chaotic and unformed as it is—is an
indispensable part of the political process. It is quite another thing
to infer direct conclusions about the legitimacy of the laws from
particular aspects of that deliberation. And that is what Weinstein
wants to do. He wants to reach a point at which we can say that P
has a right to disobey Ld or a right that it not be enforced against
him if the process that led to the enactment of Ld is tainted in some
way (that has to do with P). If the effect of the laws governing
public discourse is that P’s intended intervention must be made in
a way that doesn’t necessarily correspond to the exact way in
which P wanted to intervene, then, according to Weinstein, the
moral justification for enforcing (against P or against everyone)
some or all of the laws whose enactment is the upshot of the
overall process is diminished. This is supposed to be a focused
deontic effect (on P’s rights) that flows from the character of the
political process that was used. Now, as Weinstein knows, I want
to dispute the whole argument. But suppose one were to concede
that hate speech laws have a deleterious impact on the quality of
the political process; are we then in a position to infer a deontic
conclusion about P’s rights? The most I would concede is that
something has gone wrong with the character of public debate
overall. Individualizing its moral effects to generate particular

30. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 539–40 (quoting HANS KELSEN, A GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 287–88 (A. Wedberg trans., 1945).
31. This is almost Weinstein’s only mention of representative democracy or the role
of representatives in debating and voting on our laws.
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rights is the difficulty. Is there any good political argument that
works like this?
Suppose someone is wrongfully disenfranchised. He can
speak but it turns out he can’t vote. For example, all over the
United States at the moment, there are laws restricting access to
early voting and rules imposing onerous voter-ID requirements.
Some of these may have the effect of making it much harder—
perhaps on the day impossible—for a particular voter, let’s call
him Q, to cast his ballot. This is a deplorable state of affairs
(assuming there is no justification for these voting restrictions on
the process). But few people believe that any of the laws enacted
by the legislature (to whose membership Q’s vote might have
made the sort of difference that individual votes make in
elections) are rendered illegitimate as a result either in general
or—if this makes sense—so far as Q is concerned. No one thinks
Q now has the right to disobey the laws or not have them enforced
against him. His disenfranchisement may make the democracy
poorer, and Q certainly has a justified complaint; but nothing
follows about legitimacy and enforcement so far as his relation to
the laws is concerned. And if this doesn’t follow for Q in the
relatively formalized context of voting, how can it possibly be true
of the slight impact that hate-speech laws have on the manner of
P’s expression in a diffuse free-wheeling debate? Q, as I said, has
a complaint; and maybe P does as well. But Q’s complaint doesn’t
give rise to a legitimacy problem. And if this is true of citizen Q,
then Weinstein’s contention cannot possibly be true of P.
Even when we talk about the franchise we are never dealing
with a perfect voting system. Its flaws and its vicissitudes do not
have an individualized impact on political legitimacy. And when
we move from the franchise to the swirling maelstrom of informal
debate, we have no way of keeping track of who says what to
whom, who speaks and who listens. People in their millions say all
sorts of things and contribute more or less articulately in all sorts
of ways; and the same thing can be said in lots of different ways,
often depending on particular political and personal dynamics of
a particular situation. Most people say nothing; others only snarl
and mutter to their friends. As Dworkin has noted in another
context there is no way of equalizing political influence in these
debates; there is barely any way of conceiving what political
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equality would amount to in this context.32 The best we can do is
to say that everyone may participate as they like, though everyone
agrees there are limits on how inflammatory their participation
can be. No one has a right that his speech have any particular
effect on political outcomes. As I said earlier, most political
speech does not. And if—for reasons of social peace—limits are
placed on other effects that inflammatory speech may have, I
don’t think the background public discourse is orderly enough to
enable us to infer precise deontic conclusions about the individual
rights that flow or do not flow from the political process.
Notice that what I have said doesn’t deny that the hate speech
laws may have an impact on legitimacy; what I am denying is that
they have an impact on the state’s right to enforce particular laws
against individuals. For all I have said so far, hate speech laws may
adversely affect the legitimacy of the political system. But that is
a systemic effect, and—for the reasons I have stated—at worst a
negligible effect.
As already noted, Weinstein is not happy with this systemic
approach to legitimacy. To defend his more focused deontic
orientation, he introduces considerations about the equal
protection of interests. “[E]ach individual in society is of equal
moral worth and therefore is entitled to have his or her interests
treated with equal respect by government.”33 But then we are
back with the problem of hyperbole. The impact of hate speech
laws is most definitely not to say that the interests of racists are
not to be served by our laws: racists have the benefit of health
care, education, roads, housing and so on, and none of this is
denied to them when they are told that they may not stir up racial
hatred. That prohibition may be enforced, but still the interests of
those whom it is enforced against may still be served by the
political system.
The point can’t possibly be about interests. It must be about
respect for opinions—and not just respect for the substance of
certain opinions, but respect for the manner in which the persons
respected would like to express them. Even in this branch of the
argument there is a still a danger of hyperbole. The main way in
which we express people’s opinions in the political process is by
32. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?—Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F.L.R. 1,
812 (1987–1988).
33. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536.
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counting their votes, and we do count the votes of those whose
free expression is impacted by hate speech laws. Weinstein quotes
Dworkin as saying that the possibility of each person’s
participation in politics is important “to confirm his or her
standing as a responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of,
collective action.”34 But again one could say that there is not
necessarily any lack of respect for persons in the enforcement of
hate speech laws. It is rather that persons are respected as playing
a role that carries with it—as Dworkin’s language emphasizes—a
certain responsibility to the political process overall.
V
This brings me to the question of the relation between
political legitimacy and the justification of hate speech
restrictions. I believe that if hate speech restrictions are justified—
particularly if the justification has itself a positive relation to the
integrity of the political process—then even the argument about
systemic effects on legitimacy will not go through. After all, if it is
only unjustified restrictions on speech that affect legitimacy, then
it looks as though we will have to settle the question of
justification first, before we assess the impact on legitimacy. (So
the argument about legitimacy can hardly be cited as a reason for
thinking the hate speech laws are wrongful.)
Let us begin by asking: are all restrictions on speech
supposed to affect political legitimacy? For example, restrictions
on child pornography, true threats, malicious defamation, or
incitement? Or only restrictions that are unjustified? Weinstein
knows he has to respond to this argument. He says:
Waldron insists that banning vicious hate speech “probably has
no greater effect on political legitimacy than banning fighting
words or these other acknowledged exceptions to the freespeech principle,” such as “obscenity” (by which Waldron
seems to mean profanity), “individual libel of private persons,
disorderly conduct,” or child pornography. In support of this
conclusion he asks us to imagine that some people are so
incensed about a proposed “downstream” law that “they want
to shout ‘Fuck!’ in public, or challenge the legislation’s
proponents to a fight, . . . or display child pornography” in
opposition to the proposed legislation. Because these
particular forms of expression are undoubtedly harmful, and
34.

See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 529 (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii).
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because these protestors “can express their opposition to the
downstream laws without resorting to obscenity . . . or the
display of child pornography,” Waldron concludes that it is
“reasonable” to ask them to do so. For this reason he concludes
that “the loss of downstream legitimacy incurred as a result of
the banning of speech of these particular kinds is minimal or
nonexistent.”35

His response is that hate speech laws are distinguished from
these other (possibly justified) restrictions by being “viewpointbased.”36 I have already expressed some new reservations about
this way of describing them.37 Hate speech restrictions—of the
sort we considered in section II—are not based on viewpoint per
se, but on the manner of their expression and the effect they are
intended to have on social peace. Anyway, why should the nature
of the restriction—viewpoint-based or non-viewpoint-based—
make all the difference here? Someone is still being prevented
from saying what he wants to say as he says it. To that effect there
is still an impact on the quality of public debate: it is not as it would
be if there were no restrictions. And if a citizen thinks of himself
as the sort of person who shouts “fuck” or utters threats in
political debate or shows dirty pictures during his political
orations, then—I don’t know—maybe a case can be made that he
is not being respected as such. He is, however, being respected as
someone who could be better than that, and as someone who has
responsibilities as well as rights in the political process. But that is
another matter.
I return then to the position I mentioned at the beginning of
our discussion in section I, the position raised by Alexander
Brown, among others.38 There are such things as the conditions of
democracy: Dworkin was happy to insist on this when he wasn’t
talking about hate speech.39 In order to sustain a healthy working
democracy, a society needs social peace and it is entitled to the
assistance of citizens in maintaining that peace—or at least their
assistance in not trying to disrupt it. Democracy requires trust
among those of different views and different communities, and
stirring up hatred is a way of undermining that trust. Also—and I
think Dworkin is right about this in Freedom’s Law—the moral
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Weinstein, supra note 1, at 544 (quoting WALDRON, supra note 6, at 182–83).
Id. at 540.
See supra text accompanying note 14.
See supra text accompanying note 7.
DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 33.
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conditions for the legitimacy of democracy include a degree of
respect that citizens need to have for one another, when they put
their fate in others’ hands by accepting the outcome of a majority
vote. This is not a sensible thing to do when you are a member of
a population that is held in contempt by others. So again, we
might—at a minimum—require citizens to refrain from trying to
whip up some contempt in their interventions in public debate.
Well-drafted hate speech laws are calculated to help maintain
social peace and secure dignity and respect among members of
the community. Weinstein thinks that any such attempt
necessarily undermines the conditions of respect that are required
for a legitimate democracy. I am grateful for the opportunity to
show in these few pages that that is an artificial and one-sided
view of the matter.

